Antony Blinken on Cybersecurity, Competition With China, and the Unrelenting Pressure of Modern Diplomacy

A deep-dive interview with the U.S. Secretary of State at Foggy Bottom

A quick recap of Antony J. Blinken’s tenure as U.S. Secretary of State, now entering its fourth year: His first year was defined by navigating America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. His second was dominated by rallying global support for Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. Years three and four have been shaped almost entirely by the Israel-Hamas war. In between, he’s worked to counter growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, stall Iran’s nuclear progress—even as the Islamic Republic has repeatedly plotted to assassinate his predecessor Mike Pompeo over the 2020 killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani.

That’s just the major crises: Throw in the steady stream of smaller conflicts, coups, summits, treaties, and landmark global elections (2024 will see more people cast ballots than any other year in human history), plus this summer’s historic prisoner swap with Russia, the largest since the Cold War ended.

At 62, Blinken once dreamed of a career as a musician—or the even less lucrative path of journalism. Instead, he’s spent almost his entire professional life in Washington’s foreign policy establishment, a legacy that runs in the family: Both his father and uncle served as U.S. ambassadors during the Clinton administration. In the 2000s, Blinken was Democratic staff director for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he first built his close working partnership with then-committee chair Joe Biden.

During the Obama administration, he served as Biden’s national security adviser, a role that earned him a cameo in one of the most famous photos of the presidency: Look closely at the 2011 White House Situation Room snapshot of Obama and his top aides monitoring the Osama bin Laden raid, and Blinken is visible, peeking over the shoulder of then-White House chief of staff Bill Daley.

Blinken closed out Obama’s presidency as deputy secretary of state, so his appointment as one of Biden’s first Cabinet picks in 2021 came as no surprise. At his confirmation hearing, he shared that his stepfather was the only one of 900 students at his Polish elementary school to survive the Holocaust. For Blinken, the job is deeply personal and all-consuming—so much so that he can’t even escape it at home. This spring and summer, protesters have camped outside his residence for months, pushing him to pressure Israel to end the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza. They’ve at times poured fake blood on the driveway as Blinken, his wife White House Cabinet Secretary Evan Ryan, and their two young children (ages 4 and 5) drive in and out.

In the past three and a half years, Blinken has visited roughly 90 countries, including 15 trips to Israel. During one of his seven visits to Ukraine, he even squeezed in a jam session playing guitar at a Kyiv club, a viral moment meant to highlight Ukraine’s resilience after more than two years of brutal war.

Tech has been a core focus of much of his travel and diplomacy. In 2022, Blinken launched the State Department’s new Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy to lead U.S. global efforts on cybersecurity, and the critical intersection of tech and economic security. This past May, he delivered a keynote at the RSA Conference, the major global cybersecurity industry gathering, where he joked: “‘Move fast and break things’ is literally the exact opposite of what we try to do at the State Department.” His team is also working to modernize the notoriously outdated tech used by the State Department’s 77,000 employees across 300 embassies, consulates, and domestic offices.

In early August, shortly after Blinken returned from a six-nation trip through Laos, Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Mongolia—dubbed an “encirclement tour” by one Chinese official—I sat down with him in his personal office at the State Department’s Foggy Bottom headquarters. The small, cozy wood-paneled space is just a short walk (and several heavily armored doors) away from the building’s grander formal diplomatic reception areas. At the time of our interview, headlines were screaming about an imminent escalation of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah-Iran, and Ukraine had just launched its incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. Blinken’s schedule is timed to the minute, so we jumped straight into conversation, with the top U.S. diplomat speaking with the same casual openness he brings to private discussions.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity, combining on-the-record on-camera and off-camera remarks. Watch the full video on WIRED’s YouTube channel.

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Garrett Graff: On your first day in office, you promised you would leave the State Department ready for the 21st century. I want to start with the digital modernization work your team has done. In June 2023, the State Department was the first to uncover Chinese hacking of Microsoft systems. For those of us who cover cybersecurity, it was pretty surprising that the discovery originated here at State.

Antony Blinken: It surprised me a little too—though it was a pleasant surprise, because I was so proud that we had the right people in place to catch it. But of course, any cyber intrusion is a deep, ongoing concern, and that’s exactly why we’ve worked so hard to make this department fit for purpose when it comes to cybersecurity.

GG: One of your biggest moves was standing up the new cybersecurity bureau led by Ambassador Nate Fick. Can you talk about that effort?

AB: What I’ve seen in the three and a half years since I came back to State is that everything happening in tech and cyberspace is increasingly central to our foreign policy.

We’ve had a perfect storm of developments over the last few years that have pushed this to the top of our agenda. First, we have a new generation of foundational technologies that are all transforming the world at the same time—AI, quantum computing, microelectronics, biotech, telecommunications. They’re having a profound impact, and increasingly they’re converging and building off one another.

Second, the line between the digital and physical worlds is disappearing. Our cars, ports, hospitals are effectively giant data centers now, and that creates huge new vulnerabilities. At the same time, we have critical rare materials for tech that are in short supply, and fragile supply chains. State is taking action on every single one of these fronts.

We have to look at this holistically, across the entire stack: the hardware, the software, the talent, and then the norms, rules, and standards that govern how this technology is used.

Beyond launching the entire new Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy—bureaus are the core building blocks of our department—we’ve now trained more than 200 dedicated cybersecurity and digital policy officers, people who are genuine experts in this space. Every single one of our embassies around the world will have at least one person who is truly fluent in tech and digital policy. My goal is to get to basic digital literacy across the entire department, ideally fluency, and eventually mastery. All of this is to make sure State is equipped to operate across the entire information and digital space.

GG: Your tenure at Foggy Bottom has coincided with what feels like the end of the dream of a global open internet. Instead, we’re seeing it splinter into separate blocs: a European regulatory regime, authoritarian governments using the internet as a tool of mass surveillance, and we’ve seen this play out in U.S. policy toward Huawei and TikTok.

AB: Ideally, we don’t get that fracturing—that’s absolutely our preference. We’ve actually done a lot of work to push in the other direction, to build broad global consensus on how technology should be governed. Let’s take AI as an example. The White House did incredible work to negotiate basic principles with the major foundational AI companies around their voluntary commitments, and State has worked to bring those commitments to the global stage. We have a G7 code of conduct, all the leading democratic economies agreeing to basic safety-focused principles for AI.

We also got the first ever UN General Assembly resolution on artificial intelligence passed, with 192 countries signing on to basic safety principles and a focus on using AI to advance sustainable development goals for health, education, climate action. We also have more than 50 countries that have signed onto basic principles for the responsible military use of AI.

Our goal isn’t a bifurcated world. It’s to bring everyone together. That said, you’re right—there are areas where we’re in intense competition with other countries. If we can’t come together on rules that amplify the good of technology and minimize the harm, we have to prioritize protecting our values and our interests.

For example, when it comes to the most advanced technology—like cutting-edge chips—we want to make sure China can’t acquire those and feed them directly into its military program. They’re currently carrying out a massive, very opaque expansion of their nuclear program, and it’s not in our interest for them to have access to this highest-end technology.

Also, technology is unfortunately used all too often to repress people, for surveillance and human rights abuses. We want to make sure our technology isn’t used for that. We want to make sure we’re protecting, not enabling, that kind of harm.

Broadly, we see technology as a profound force for good and progress. But for specific parts of the tech ecosystem, we have to put protections in place. We also need supply chains that are both resilient and diversified, so we’re not dependent on any single country for critical inputs. We lived through Covid, we saw what that can lead to. We don’t want that same dynamic with critical technology.

GG: Let me turn to Russia and ransomware, another issue that’s defined your tenure and this administration’s national security agenda over the last few years. Is there more the U.S. and the Western alliance can do to push Russia to crack down on ransomware gangs, or is this an intractable problem?

AB: It’s an ongoing challenge. Early in President Biden’s term, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he engaged President Putin directly on this issue, and we were making some progress getting Russia to act more responsibly on ransomware. Then the invasion happened, and that made the entire relationship far more difficult than it already was. Unfortunately, I think there are limits to what we can achieve right now. That said, we’re working more and more collaboratively, not just with the private sector but with other countries, to develop shared strategies and build solidarity, because so many countries and companies are affected by the scourge of ransomware.

GG: Your predecessor Mike Pompeo’s tenure was defined by “swagger.” It feels like the last few years have had a very different tempo, that your tenure has been defined more by the limits of American power—from Afghanistan to Ukraine to the Middle East to China.

AB: I actually question that premise. I don’t think what we’ve experienced over the last few years highlights the limits of American power. On the contrary, I think in many ways we’ve seen a rejuvenation of American power.

When President Biden took office, the first thing he told me was: “Go out and reinvigorate, reengage, and if necessary reimagine our partnerships and alliances around the world.” He did that for a very clear reason. Looking at the world and America’s place in it, we came to two basic conclusions: First, when the U.S. isn’t engaged, when we aren’t leading, either someone else steps in—and usually not in a way that advances our interests and values—or just as bad, no one steps in, and the vacuum gets filled by bad actors. American engagement and leadership is one side of the coin, but the flip side is working to cooperate and collaborate with all the different actors that have an increasingly powerful role in shaping the world’s direction. The fact is, for all the extraordinary power we have across virtually every domain, we’re far more effective at solving problems when we work with others than when we go it alone.

GG: Where have you seen those alliances deliver results?

AB: Look at Ukraine: We’ve brought together more than 50 countries to support Ukraine’s defense, not just in Europe but across Asia, taking coordinated steps to back Ukraine, punish Russia, and strengthen NATO in ways that are genuinely historic. That’s a product of American leadership.

We’ve also seen tremendous convergence on how to approach China and the challenges it poses, both across the transatlantic community and with our key allies and partners in Asia. In all my time working on these issues, I’ve never seen greater agreement on how to assess the challenges and what to do about them.

We’ve built coalitions on everything from global health, to effectively responding to Covid and getting vaccines distributed, to what is arguably the biggest public health crisis facing Americans today: fentanyl. Fentanyl is the number one killer of Americans aged 18 to 45—not guns, not car crashes, not cancer. It’s fentanyl. We’ve used diplomacy to get greater cooperation from China to crack down on the flow of chemical precursors used to make fentanyl, and we’ve built a coalition of more than 150 countries working together to stop the diversion of these precursors around the world.

When we engage, when we lead, when we bring others along with us, that is a demonstration of American power, not a sign of its limits.

GG: What have you learned about the world in this job that you didn’t know when you took office?

AB: I had 30 years of experience in this space going in, so I had my ideas. But like anything, you have your plans, and then you have first contact with reality, and you have to adjust.

Two things really stand out, even sharper than I imagined they would be. First, the challenges we face are more diverse, more complex, and more interconnected than at any point in my career. That really hit home. I knew that intuitively, but you don’t really feel it until you’re dealing with it every day. We all tend to romanticize the past a little bit.

The second biggest change, for me, is the information environment. When I started in government at the beginning of the Clinton administration, basically everyone got their news the same way: You woke up in the morning, grabbed a print copy of the New York Times, Washington Post, or Wall Street Journal off your doorstep. Then if you had a TV in your office, you turned it on at 6:30 pm for the network news on CBS, NBC, or ABC. Those were your main sources, they set the rhythm of your day. Now, we’re getting new information 24/7 at breakneck speed, every millisecond bringing a new development. The pressure to respond immediately is so much more intense. That really drove home how important it is to have discipline, to step back, not just react, but take the time to gather information, coordinate with all stakeholders, and think through a problem. The pressure to react instantly is stronger than it’s ever been.

GG: You’ve been part of a 30-year arc of how Washington thinks about China. For decades, the Washington consensus was that integrating China economically would reshape its political system and its global behavior. That consensus has collapsed in recent years. What’s your take on this shift?

AB: There was that consensus for many years, that integrating China—especially economically—would change its political system and how it engaged the world. That consensus has fallen away in recent years, because we do see a China that, for reasons that may be understandable from their perspective, does seek to be the leading global actor across military, diplomatic, political, and economic spheres. If they shared our basic values and interests, that would be one thing, but they don’t. They have a completely different worldview. So this is intense competition, because we’re at the dawn of a new era. We’re past the post-Cold War era, and there’s an intense competition to shape what comes next. We’re competing with China to do that.

GG: What have you learned about China in this job?

AB: You can’t sum up this relationship with a simple bumper sticker. If I had to pick one word, it’s “competition.” For Americans, competition isn’t a bad thing—on the contrary, as long as it’s fair, as long as it’s on a level playing field, competition brings out the best in us. But we also need to make sure that competition doesn’t turn into conflict.

There are other important dimensions to the relationship too, which is why any bumper sticker would have to be really long. As the two most powerful countries in the world, there are areas where it’s in the interest of the American people, the Chinese people, and people around the world for us to cooperate, to communicate effectively, to minimize the risk of conflict even as we compete. We restored military-to-military communications, which is critical to avoiding misunderstandings, and that’s now active at all levels. That’s a good thing.

GG: Elon Musk is an American citizen who wields enormous geopolitical power. We’ve seen that with Starlink in Ukraine, and with X’s handling of the Venezuelan election. How concerned are you about his global role, and the gap between the priorities of U.S. tech platforms and U.S. foreign policy?

AB: I’m not going to focus on any one individual. We do recognize the extraordinary power and impact that platforms have, just like the companies that developed foundational technologies including generative AI. We want to see platforms, companies, and innovators act responsibly, and that involves a few things.

First, it involves collaboration between the federal government and these companies, which we’ve done extensively and intensely. I’ve met many times with leaders of critical tech companies to talk through how they see the world, how we see it, and how we can work together.

A big part of this is setting the rules, norms, and standards for how technology is used. In an ideal world, companies and platforms will do a lot of this work themselves, which is often preferable—sometimes government comes in with a sledgehammer instead of a scalpel.

GG: How do you use tech in your daily life? Do you have a secret Instagram account you scroll in the evening? TikTok? What sites do you visit every day?

AB: I have a set of go-to sites I check first thing every morning on my iPhone, but I shouldn’t do free advertising, so I’ll leave that out. The throughline in my life is music, it’s what I always come back to. Tech has made it so much easier for me to access and listen to music, it’s opened up whole new worlds.

GG: Has being a dad changed how you think about tech?

AB: Like any parent of young kids, it’s both exciting and a little scary. You see how naturally kids take to technology, how brilliantly designed it is for even young users. When my son was around 3, he wanted to watch Sesame Street videos on my iPhone—we